The Sizzle or the Steak? How Individuals Process Political Cues by Nielsen, Ben
Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research 
Volume 24 Issue 1 Article 9 
2019 
The Sizzle or the Steak? How Individuals Process Political Cues 
Ben Nielsen 
Illinois Wesleyan University, bnielsen@iwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nielsen, Ben () "The Sizzle or the Steak? How Individuals Process Political Cues," 
Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 24 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol24/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon 
Center for Curricular and Faculty Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the 
President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by the the editors of Res 
Publica at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@iwu.edu. 
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document. 
The Sizzle or the Steak? How Individuals Process Political Cues 
Abstract 
The majority of the American electorate is uninformed with regards to politics, and to compensate for 
their lack of knowledge, they take political cues from perceived experts. This study examines the impact 
of political cues from various sources, and considers how individuals analyze source credibility and 
framing. The study was conducted on Illinois Wesleyan University’s campus, via survey collection. Post 
data analysis, the surveys proved cues given by perceived experts were more compelling than non-
perceived experts, and emotional cues were more compelling than rational cues. These findings confirm 
individuals use peripheral route processing more frequently than central route processing , in accordance 
with the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo 1980). The multi-regression model also confirms 
that individuals with lower levels of political knowledge accept cues at higher frequencies. 
This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/
respublica/vol24/iss1/9 
   
             The Sizzle or the Steak?  
How Individuals Process Political Cues 
                     ​Benjamin Nielsen 
 
                           ​Abstract 
    The majority of the American electorate is 
uninformed with regards to politics, and to 
compensate for their lack of knowledge, they 
take political cues from perceived experts. This 
study examines the impact of political cues 
from various sources, and considers how 
individuals analyze source credibility and 
framing. The study was conducted on Illinois 
Wesleyan University’s campus, via survey 
collection. Post data analysis, the surveys 
proved cues given by perceived experts were 
more compelling than non-perceived experts, 
and emotional cues were more compelling than 
rational cues. These findings confirm 
individuals use ​peripheral​ ​route processing 
more frequently than ​central route processing​, 
in accordance with the elaboration likelihood 
model (Petty & Cacioppo 1980). The 
multi-regression model also confirms that 
individuals with lower levels of political 
knowledge accept cues at higher frequencies. 
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    On November 6, 2018 approximately 110 
million politically motivated Americans turned 
out and participated in the midterm elections. 
This was the highest turnout in 50 years and 27 
million more voters than in the 2014 midterm 
elections. This new political vigor is the result 
of hyper-polarization, successful get out to vote 
campaigns, and the assistance of our rather 
eccentric commander-in-chief. Whether you 
agree with Trump’s policies, rhetoric, or 
general disposition as the president, he has 
certainly enticed many people to participate in 
the democratic system. However, this new 
influx of voters are so entrenched in their jobs 
and families, that many of them do not have 
time to be well read on ​every ​aspect of political 
discussion. Voters compensate by taking 
information shortcuts and relying on cues they 
have gotten from a wide variety of sources. 
This process called a ​heuristic ​(information 
shortcut)​ ​is employed when we watch 
television, scroll the internet, and learn through 
interactions with others. This process is 
especially prominent in the political sphere, 
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 because many voters cannot rationalize ​every 
complex political argument. It is a lot to ask 
someone to be fluent in the language of 
taxation, foreign policy, healthcare, 
environmental regulations, and agriculture.. 
There are 16 standing committees in the 
Senate, 20 standing committees in the House, 
and even these experienced politicians refer to 
technocrats to assist them in the decision 
making process.  
    This research does not speak to the existence 
of cue taking in the American political culture. 
These findings are numerous, with particular 
emphasis on the association between cue taking 
and the media (Carter 2013; Boomgaarden and 
Semetko 2011; Iyengar 1990). Instead of 
simply identifying the existence of cue taking, 
this study is interested in what contextual 
factors impact the cue taking process. What 
exactly limits or intensifies the probability that 
the cue will stick to a malleable individual? In 
addition, what kinds of individuals are more  
susceptible to cue taking?  
 
1. Literature Review 
    A large portion of the existing literature 
regarding political attitudes is dedicated to 
accurately predicting how an individual will 
vote, and these algorithms and spatial models 
that predict a voter’s preferences are referred to 
as voter I.D models. There are numerous voter 
I.D models that can predict with relatively high 
accuracy how people will likely vote (Shapiro 
1992; Kelley & Mirer 1973; Markus & 
Converse 1979). All of these models are 
predicated on two assumptions regarding the 
voting method of an individual. They theorize 
that citizens vote ​in the moment ​ and ​use 
memory-based processes​ to arrive at their 
political conclusions. As far as voting ​in the 
moment, ​the models assume that voters gauge 
their preferences with their current standard of 
living. ​Memory-based processes​ implies that 
voters use their prior political knowledge to 
measure candidates against one another. This 
indicates that individuals are politically 
informed, and have at least a decent 
understanding of political actors and salient 
issues. This assumption bodes curiosity, 
because it is well established that the American 
public is woefully uninformed regarding 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter 
1994).  However despite the lack of 
information, Americans express opinions on a 
wide range of issues. This begs the question, 
where are these voters getting their political 
attitudes from, if we know they aren’t engaging 
in frequent political learning (Converse 1960; 
Downs 1957)? This leads experts to believe 
that Americans frequently participate in 
political cue taking. 
    This study of cue taking speaks directly to 
the research of Richard Petty and John 
Cacioppo (1980), in which they conclude there 
are 2 strategies that individuals use to take cues 
from elites. The utilized methods are ​central 
route processing and peripheral route 
processing.​ (Petty & Cacioppo 1980). “The 
central route to persuasion entails consideration 
of substantive content, including evidence and 
the soundness of an argument’s logic. The 
primary determinant of persuasion through 
central processing is argument strength”(Gilens 
& Murakawa 2002, pg. 15). This cue taking 
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 requires relatively high degrees of political 
knowledge, and an equally high standard of 
interest in salient issues. Given that the 
majority of the public cannot sustain adequate 
interest toward elites for the content of their 
cues, they partake in another heuristic that is 
less time consuming, but potentially less 
accurate. “ The peripheral route, in contrast, 
emphasizes consideration of factors external to 
message content, such as the credibility and 
attractiveness of the message source. The 
primary determinants of peripheral-route 
persuasion are “persuasion cues” which 
produce attitude change “without any active 
thinking about the attributes of the issue or the 
object under consideration”(Gilens & 
Murakawa 2002, pg. 16). 
    With the foundation of central route versus 
peripheral processing being established, it 
remains unknown which technique is employed 
most frequently. It would be incorrect to 
assume that an individual will only look at 
substantive evidence, while another only looks 
at the character of the cue giver. The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is a key 
determinant in how an individual will interpret 
the cue, and furthermore continue to act on the 
advice the elite is giving. “The ELM states that 
the amount and nature of the thinking that a 
person does about a persuasive message is a 
very important determinant of the kind of 
persuasion that occurs”(Petty & Cacioppo 
1981). Central route theory must result in 
elaboration, where the subject uses this new 
evidence and tests it against existing evidence 
in their schema to draw conclusions. With 
merit being the driving factor for an individual 
analyzing the cue, valence is the key ingredient 
for how the individual will interpret the 
message. Conclusions regarding central route 
processing include “(a) The cue will be 
relatively easy to be called to mind 
(accessible), (b) relatively persistent and stable 
over time, (c) relatively resistant to challenge 
from competing messages, and (d) relatively 
predictive of the person’s attitude-relevant 
judgements and behavior” (Petty & Cacioppo 
1981, pg 34).  
    In contrast to central route processing, 
peripheral route processing relies on the 
source’s attractiveness and message length. 
Instinctively one can assume that individuals 
tasked with interpreting convoluted issues of 
tax reform, health care etc. use peripheral cues 
generally, because previous knowledge is 
required. But a candidate providing this cue 
could appear to have a “sincere demeanor and 
good values” if they are standing in front of an 
American flag, or visiting veterans. Peripheral 
route cues will be less accessible, persistent, 
resistant, and predictive of behavior, than by 
individuals using central route processing. Both 
central route and peripheral route processing 
are utilized by voters to access cues from their 
perceived experts, but there has been no 
elaboration about which is employed more 
frequently among individuals. I do hypothesize 
that there will be a positive relationship 
between an individual’s likelihood to accept a 
cue, when they associate a higher levels of 
perceived expertise from the source, and higher 
levels of emotional appeal. 
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 2. Research Design & Data Analysis 
    There is an assumption among academics 
that individuals are only taking cues from 
political elites, where nothing could be further 
from the truth. Individuals, whether they mean 
to or not, acquire political cues from a 
multitude of mediums. Neighbors, social 
media, TV ads etc. are just some of the political 
messages that individuals sort through. this 
provokes a  question regarding what political 
cues are sticking to malleable individuals when 
others do not, if  people aren’t focusing on 
what is being said, but on who is saying it, and 
how its being said? Analyzing political opinion 
has been done a variety of ways. Gallup, Pew, 
and the Brookings Institute all have various 
methods to gauge an individual’s political 
knowledge and opinions from issues and 
candidates alike. But for the importance of this 
study it is important to focus on a few variables  
that determine how likely the cue is to “stick.”  
    To look at this, the subjects will be given 
surveys with a variety of political arguments on 
them from a source. Anybody from a university 
professor to your neighbor will be providing 
the cue to the subject. They will “think 
carefully about them” and indicate whether 
they think the cue is agreeable or not. Subjects 
are then asked to respond to this cue by 
indicating whether or not they believe this 
argument to be compelling, and actually shift 
their view. This dichotomy of agreeableness 
and compellingness is important, as there are 
many arguments that individuals agree with, 
but ultimately the cue is unsuccessful if they do 
not use that information to shape their beliefs. 
“fast and frugal heuristic is 
‘one-reason decision making,’ a method 
of decision making that uses only one 
piece of information. The most 
frequently used variant is called ‘take 
the best,’ a decision technique where 
the single piece of information that is 
judged best is used alone for decision 
making. This decision criterion is 
compared with others. Many of the 
comparisons are made using real world 
data that were originally used in 
statistics textbooks to illustrate 
regression techniques. These simple 
techniques can obtain results as good 
as, or better than, those obtained from 
more sophisticated statistical 
techniques, such as regression analysis 
or Bayesian mechanisms” ​(Rubin 
2018). 
 
    ​The two variables that will influence the 
subject (according to Peripheral Route 
Processing) is the strength of expertise a 
subject believes the cue giver to possess, and 
the focus of  either logic or emotion in the 
context of the argument. Instinctively the first 
independent variable looks at how much of an 
“expert” a cue giver is, before even analyzing 
the argument at all. Looking at the source’s 
occupation acts as a “pre-test” for the subject, 
and it would be reasonable to assume that if the 
subject doesn’t have certain qualifications then 
they are immediately dismissed by the subject. 
Looking next at how the argument is framed 
poses some slight methodological problems. 
“Facts v. Emotion” exists on a continuum 
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 (Pach & Koch 1983), and there is a natural 
blend of the two in any effective argument. But 
by viewing the two frames as a dichotomy, it 
creates a cross table for the questions asked, 
and it has 4 quadrants. “Experts” that rely 
heavily on rational appeal, which includes 
arguments about statistics and logistical claims. 
“Experts” who use emotional appeal, and 
utilize mainly anecdotes in their arguments. 
“Non-experts that use logistical appeal, and 
“non-experts” that use emotional appeal. . 
These paradigms have become caricatures in 
the survey, and analyzing how subjects respond 
to each of them will assist in identifying critical 
variables for the likelihood a cue will stick.The 
main analysis will be the difference of means 
test between the initial question of 
agreeableness from the source, and the question 
of compellingness regarding the sources 
argument. If there is a significant difference 
between both questions, we can conclude that a 
certain source was perceived as more credible. 
To analyze the characteristics of malleable 
individuals, performing a multiple regression 
will illustrate how much explained variance we 
can identify in the subjects.  
    Representing the expert, who uses logistical 
emphasis in their argument, we have Illinois 
Farm Bureau Director Valerie. Her cue on the 
survey is, “Since its inception in 1990, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) allowed for an economic boom in 
the agriculture industry. In 2016 alone, 
Midwest states including Illinois and Iowa have 
exports that exceed 1 billion dollars in soy, 
corn, and cattle. The disintegration of NAFTA 
would cause a collapse of the Midwest farmer.” 
She operates within the realm of agriculture in 
the Midwest, and also employs statistics that 
show her expertise, on the issue of NAFTA. 
This relationship between expertise, and logic 
represents a large portion of technocratic 
influence in congressional committees, 
bureaucrats, and party leadership. 
    Perceived political experts are not only 
obligated to using logic when framing their 
argument, but many of them employ emotional 
appeal when framing arguments involving the 
environment, immigration, and gun violence 
(Walton) Representing this section of the 
crosstab is Professor of Mexican history Jude 
Barta. For example, Jude’s cue involves 
immigration, a highly debated topic in the 
political sphere. “Illegal immigrants are not 
only taking jobs away from Americans in 
various markets, but are commiting crimes at 
significantly higher rates than U.S citizens.  We 
need to secure our borders, and deport 
individuals that did not come to this country 
legally.” There is perceived expertise by the 
subject, simply because they’ve earned the title 
of a professor which shows merit based 
successes in the field of academia. In addition, 
the subject could perceive additional expertise 
about immigration, by associating a 
relationship with “Mexican history,” and a 
majority of the immigration debate is about 
illegal immigrants from Mexico. This argument 
shows no sign of statistical evidence, and 
doesn’t reference data in any way. However, 
there is strong emotional appeal, by equating 
the loss of American jobs and increased crime 
rate, to the presence of illegal immigrants. 
    Individuals do not simply take political cues 
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 from “experts,” but they take them from 
individuals in their day to day lives. Some 
could argue the process of political 
socialization takes place almost exclusively 
without “expertise” influencing your decisions. 
Parents, neighbors, schools, and celebrities all 
provide cues to individuals, whether or not they 
truly have expertise on any subjects. An 
example of a “non-expert” that uses logistical 
appeal in the survey is Moses Montefiore 
Rabbi Colleen Marza. Her cue given in the 
survey is, “The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates the federal budget deficit was $782 
billion in fiscal year 2018, and it was $116 
billion more than the shortfall recorded in fiscal 
year 2017. This is why we need reduce military 
spending which increased 36 billion dollars in 
2018.” As a clergywoman, there is no 
indication given to the subject that she is 
experienced in the realm of fiscal policy, but 
she evaluates Congressional budget office 
statistics. Many of the statistics, and census 
data is available to anyone, however 
individuals (according to PRT) would not 
perceive her as an expert without an additional 
degree, or career associated with economics, 
because it doesn’t demonstrate a passion, or 
interest in the domain. 
    The last individuals that can provide us with 
cues, is the perceived “non-expert” that uses 
emotional appeal. Seemingly the weakest 
argument, we are surrounded by neighbors and 
relatives that provide anecdotal evidence with 
little to no source credibility. However, through 
socialization these play the greatest role in an 
individual’s path to political identity formation 
(Blum-Kulka) Representing this group is my 
neighbor Thomas Mackie. The cue he provides 
in the survey is, “Climate change is this current 
generation’s greatest threat. If our current rate 
of carbon emission continue, we will live in a 
world consumed by natural disasters. We need 
to increase federal spending into clean energy, 
and increase restrictions on fossil fuel 
production.” This cue provides us with no 
sources, data, or actual evidence regarding our 
“current carbon emissions.” His hyperbole 
regarding the imminent danger we are all in 
sets the tone for the subject to feel scared, and 
accept this cue, so that their posterity will 
survive. These 4 paradigms represent who 
individuals get information from, but there’s 
more to the equation than simply who is giving 
the cue.  
    To avoid any confirmation bias among 
politically active individuals, I decided not to 
attach partisanship to any of the cue givers, as 
research has shown a strong linkage to 
confirmation bias among individuals who seek 
cues (Zaller 1992, Gigerenzer 1992). But there 
needs to be an established level of political 
knowledge among the subjects, as high levels 
of political knowledge can result in high levels 
of confirmation bias (Popkin 1994). To 
measure political knowledge the subjects were 
given 5 questions from ​What Americans Know 
About Politics and Why It Matters​ (Delli 
Carpini & Keeter 1996).  
What are the first 10 amendments of the 
Constitution called? 
What is the name of the current Vice 
President? 
Under the Constitution who nominates Federal 
judges? 
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 What political party currently controls the U.S 
House of Representatives? 
What is the current unemployment rate in the 
United States? 
 
    These authors found a high level of 
correlation between accuracy on these 
questions, and more general political 
knowledge. By determining a subjects interest 
in politics, we can also determine whether they 
would be more malleable than others. This will 
be tested by asking questions about how much 
news they consume on average per week. We 
have given liberty to the subject to define 
“news” which can range from social media, to 
political ads, or cable television. There was 
considerable variation to the issue of the 
political arguments that are being analyzed by 
the subject. This is to allow for a diversity of 
emotional and logistical appeals, and also to 
possibly shed some light on the political 
malleability certain individuals have as it 
pertains to certain subjects. The raw data was 
collected over a period of approximately 3 
weeks, and there were 201 surveys that 
comprised the N, in the study. These surveys 
were conducted by myself in classes with 
expressed permission from professors, and in 
Ames library from willing participants. 
3. Results 
   The coding process for the surveys was 
consistent for both the “agreeableness” 
question and the “compellingness” question. 
“Agreeableness” was the question asking the 
subject, “Do you agree with the statement?” 
and “compellingness” is the question that asked 
the subject “Is this argument compelling?” A 
“yes” was coded as 1.00, and a “no” was coded 
as 0.00. In order to provide a reliable and valid 
score of the true attitudes regarding political 
cues, the inclusion of the option “I don’t know” 
was necessary. Coding the “I don’t know” 
answers as missing cases provided a true value 
for the attitudes towards both the “agreeable” 
and “compelling” questions. The pro-NAFTA 
cue given by the Farm Bureau caricature had 
the most missing cases (51), and this is likely 
due to lack of political knowledge associated 
with agriculture. The knowledge questions 
were gauged on a scale of 1-4 for accuracy. 
The question “​Which party currently controls 
the House of Representatives​” was omitted 
from the study, because the survey was 
administered shortly after the midterm 
elections. The Democratic party had just won 
back the house from the Republicans, the 
timing and wording of this question resulted in 
many many answers, and would have created 
noise in the individual knowledge scores. 
When subjects identified their political party, 
there was a sliding scale of 1-5, which 
Democrats being coded as 1.00, Independents 
as 3.00, and Republicans as 5.00. Regardless of 
their answer for this question, the subjects had 
to indicate what political preferences they 
“usually” align with. This sliding scale 
included 2 additional options into the above 
measure with “slightly democratic” coded as 
2.0, and “slightly republican” as 4.0. This 
question is meant to tease out individuals who 
identify themselves as independents. Gallup 
reports that about ⅓ of the American electorate 
consists of independent voters, however given 
our two-party system, we thought it was 
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 necessary to keep individuals honest in their 
political preferences. Age was coded as the 
number they provided, and the median age of 
the study was 20. The final question that was 
coded, referred to the subject’s perceived 
interest in politics, by asking about how much 
news they consume in a weekly basis. “0-1 
hours” was a 1.00, “2-3 hours” was a 3.00, “4-5 
hours” was a 5.00, “6-7 hours” was a 7.00, and 
“more than 7 hours” was coded as an 8.00.  
    Before any real conclusions could be drawn 
from the surveys, I initially had to determine if 
the cues my caricatures provided were fair and 
balanced. The study doesn’t hold much weight 
if every cue was undeniable, or if every cue 
contained a weak argument. Because of this, 
the caricatures vary depending on their 
hypothetical ideological arguments. There were 
5 “liberal” arguments and 5 “conservative” 
arguments. This variance was supposed to 
represent a fair, and balanced panel of political 
sources. The ​Chart 1​ shows the distribution of 
“agreeableness” among survey respondents, 
and what can be seen is a relatively normally 
distributed graph. A “truly” fair set of questions 
would result in a mean of .5, concluding that 
about half of my statements were agreeable, 
and half were not. The mean was .56, which 
indicates a level of neutrality, and might 
suggest that individuals slightly more often 
than not agreed with the cue provided to them. 
Chart 1: Mean= .56; SD= .152; N=201 
Ghart 2: Mean=.64; SD= .224; N=201 
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    The ​Chart 2​ speaks to the “agreeableness,” 
however there was less consistency when we 
analyzed the distribution of “compellingness” 
answers from the surveys. The graphs mean 
distribution of .64,  implies there was no 
overwhelming bias in the framing of the cues, 
and it highlights a subject was more likely to 
accept the cue than reject it.  
    After determining the cues were fair, and can 
accurately be analyzed, next was looking at 
what sources gave the most effective cues in 
the survey. The data measured indicates that 
the there was no significant difference in the 
level between “agreeableness” for sources with 
perceived expertise, and sources with no 
perceived expertise. With a mean of .56 for 
“agreeableness” and .55 for “compellingness, 
this again indicates a level of fairness and 
confirms that arguments were agreeable, 
regardless of the perceived expertise from the 
source. However, there is significant difference 
when we compare the mean “compellingness” 
scores against perceived experts, and 
non-experts. ​See Table 1. 
    The overall mean “compellingness” score 
with perceived experts was .68, while 
non-experts mean score was .59. This 
difference seems slight, but given the smaller 
question size, this difference indicates the 
subjects trusted the perceived expert’s cue in 
about 1 more question than the non- expert. 
With half of our theoretical crosstab explained, 
with regards to survey respondents opinions on 
the sources, the next test is to determine what 
frame is most effective in an argument. My 
initial hypothesis claimed that higher levels of 
emotional appeal would compel the subjects 
significantly more than rational appeal, 
however this wasn’t the case. The frequency 
table displayed a slight edge to emotional 
appeal with mean of .63 for cues that leaned on 
a rational frame, and a mean of .65 for cues that 
leaned on an emotional frame. This slight 
difference implies almost little to no difference 
in how individuals processed rational versus 
emotional cues. ​See Table 2. 
    These findings may speak to the preferences 
of individuals that have limited information to 
make a decision. This would confirm that 
individuals partake in peripheral route 
processing theory at higher rates, as more 
significant emphasis seems to be put in the 
expertise of the source providing the cue and 
not as much in the framing of the cue.  
    The “agreeableness” multi-regression model 
calculates how much explained variance exists 
within the survey questions that were aimed at 
determining the malleability of an individual. 
The regression model was able to explain .17 
(adjusted r-square) of the variance, which 
leaves a lot of the unexplained variance in the 
data, but it means we have part of the puzzle. 
The explained variance dropped significantly, 
when we switched to the regression model for 
“compellingness.” I would argue this 
demonstrates framing had little to no effect on 
the subject’s perception of the cue. This aligns 
with our evidence above, that suggested the 
mean scores of emotional cues had no 
significant difference from rational cues. See 
Table 3. 
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics      
 N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Agreeableness 201 0.17 1 0.5568 0.16239 
Compellingness 201 0 1 0.6405 0.22439 
Agreeableness Expert 201 0 1 0.5613 0.23087 
Agreeableness Non-Expert 201 0 1 0.5543 0.22223 
Valid N (listwise) 201     
 
Table 2: 
Statistics    
  Compellingness Expert Compellingness Non-Expert 
N Valid 201 201 
 Missing 4 4 
Mean  0.6841 0.5988 
 
 
Table 3:​ Statistics 
 Compellingness Rational Compellingness Emotional 
N Valid 201 201 
Missing 4  
4 
Mean 0.626 0.6502 
 
    The regression models reveal there is still a 
lot of unexplained variance in an individual’s 
probability they will accept a cue, but both 
regression models identified there were two 
significant variables in the model. ​See Table 4, 
5, 6, 7.​ With a negative beta weight of -.03 for 
“agreeableness” and -.04 for “compellingness”, 
this confirms that individuals with less political 
knowledge will not only agree with political 
cues, but they will find them more compelling 
as well. This intuitively confirms the suspicion 
that individuals who don’t have an existing 
schema of political knowledge, must accept the 
survey’s cues at higher levels. In addition, 
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 when asked to define their “usual political 
preferences,” the regression model identifies a 
slight leaning towards the republican party with 
concerns to the “agreeableness” regression, in 
addition to the “compellingness” model. I 
would argue this trend is susceptible to change 
if the study is repeated, especially if the cues 
leaned more towards a democratic bias. Interest 
in politics, age, and gender could not explain 
very much variance in either model. 
    With multiple lines of evidence, we can 
confirm that individuals are partaking in 
peripheral route processing at higher levels 
than central route processing. The mean scores 
for the frame of the cues were not significantly 
different depending on the sources tendency to 
lean either on rational or emotional arguments. 
However, expertise played a much more 
significant role in the subject’s likelihood to 
accept the cues. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4​: Model Summary - Agreeableness 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .438a 0.191 0.17 0.14794 
a Predictors: (Constant), Decision Making, Regardless Political Party, Knowledge, News Consumption, 
Gender 
 
                                                                                   Table 5​: Coefficients A 
Model  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta   
 (Constant) 0.498 0.037  13.481 0 
 Gender 0.035 0.024 0.108 1.455 0.147 
 
Regardless 
Political Party 0.043 0.008 0.363 5.28 0 
 Knowledge -0.025 0.01 -0.176 -2.531 0.012 
 
News 
Consumption -0.002 0.007 -0.017 -0.234 0.816 
 Decision Making 8.47E-05 0 0.014 0.22 0.826 
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                                                                Table 6​: Model Summary - Compellingness 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error  
1 .268a 0.072 0.047 0.21964 
a Predictors: (Constant), Decision Making, Regardless Political Party, Knowledge, News Consumption, Gender 
 
 
 
Table 7​: Coefficients A 
Model  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) 0.647 0.055  11.809 0 
 Gender -0.004 0.036 -0.009 -0.116 0.908 
 
Regardless 
Political Party 0.031 0.012 0.187 2.536 0.012 
 Knowledge -0.03 0.014 -0.156 -2.105 0.037 
 
News 
Consumption -0.002 0.01 -0.015 -0.191 0.849 
 
Decision 
Making 0.001 0.001 0.106 1.503 0.134 
a Dependent Variable: Compellingness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 4. Conclusions 
    Many individuals displayed a tendency to 
accept expert cues at higher rates in the raw 
data, which allows me to confirm at least part 
of my hypothesis. But given the lack of support 
to suggest emotional cues are significantly 
more compelling than rational cues, I am 
forced to reject the whole hypothesis. Petty and 
Cacioppo’s ELM theory speaks directly to the 
data, and this would suggest that individuals 
pay much closer attention to the source 
providing the cue, rather than the content of the 
cue itself. This strategy of peripheral route 
processing worries me, because in a time where 
there are immense collections of information 
from competing experts, individuals could 
potentially accept clusters of incorrect cues 
from polarized political elites. Voters can exist 
in their own echo chambers, where facts can be 
distorted to appeal to their existing biases. Not 
to mention, by ​significantly ​analyzing the cue’s 
source over the message, an individual could 
stop a dialogue from occurring before one can 
even begins. Donald Trump may not be the 
most likeable individual, and he may even 
tweet the occasional false statement, however it 
would be wrong to simply disregard every 
word that he speaks, simply because you do not 
trust him. At the very least it implies that all 
individuals should at least make an effort to 
expose themselves to sources who potentially 
will provide them with different cues. Striving 
for more political knowledge can only improve 
the democratic process, as 1 more informed 
voter helps bring the collective closer to 
choosing the “correct” candidate for office. 
Individuals that don’t possess prior knowledge 
on politics need to make an attempt to 
familiarize themselves with political actors, 
institutions, and salient issues. Utilizing a 
heuristic is a good start, and should be used to 
fill small gaps in a voter’s political knowledge. 
However, solely relying on cue taking 
potentially leaves a voter capable of casting an 
“uninformed vote,” and potentially damaging 
the democratic process. 
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